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AN OUTSIDER LOOKS AT INSIDER TRADING:
CHIARELLA, DIRKS AND THE DUTY TO
DISCLOSE MATERIAL NONPUBLIC
INFORMATION
I. Introduction
The prohibition against "insider trading"' is an acknowledged pol-
icy under the federal securities laws. 2 While many sources have con-
tributed to this prohibition,3 much of the law on insider trading has
1. "Insider trading" refers to the practice of trading securities on both organized
stock exchanges and the over-the-counter market based upon material nonpublic
information. Wang, Trading On Material Nonpublic Information On Impersonal
Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, And Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule lOb-5,
54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1219 n.2 (1981). See also Langevoort, Insider Trading and
the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982).
"Material" and "nonpublic" are also terms of art which have specific meaning.
"Material" information has been defined as that information to which "a reasonable
man would attach importance ... in determining his choice of action in the transac-
tion in question." List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965)
(emphasis added). Such a test also includes information "which in reasonable and
objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock or secur-
ities." Id. at 462 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642
(7th Cir. 1963). For a further discussion of material nonpublic information, see
Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into The Responsibility To
Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 803 (1973); Kripke, Rule 10b-
5 Liability and "Material Facts", 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061 (1971); Note, The Reliance
Requirement In Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 593
(1975).
"Nonpublic" information "refers to information that investors may not lawfully
acquire without the consent of the source. It also includes information which,
although it may lawfully be disseminated, is not yet generally available." Brudney,
Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 n.2 (1979). See In re Investors Management Co., 44
S.E.C. 633, 643 (1971).
"Information" refers generally to two categories: "corporate" information and
"market" information. Corporate information concerns "information relating to the
intrinsic value of the issuer, primarily its business and operations," while market
information encompasses "a residual category of noncorporate information," such as
information on a potential tender offer. Langevoort, supra, at 42. See Heller,
Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus.
LAW. 517, 526-32 (1982).
2. Langevoort, supra note 1, at 1.
3. The development of the law of insider trading has been influenced by com-
mon law cases, specifically those dealing with the tort of misrepresentation. See W.
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developed under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19344
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 5 These antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws, often described as "catchall" sections,6
have served as the primary bulwarks against insider trading, even
though neither provision specifically addresses the issue of insider
trading.7 Nevertheless, the fundamental prohibition against insider
trading has been accepted by the business and legal communities.'
At the heart of the prohibition against insider trading is the concept
known as the "abstain or disclose" rule,9 which states that persons in
CARY & M. EISENBERC, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 713-18 (5th ed.
1980). Also, certain well-known cases have added to the prohibitions on insider
trading by developing state corporation laws. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24
N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969) (insider held liable to his
corporation for trading on material nonpublic information based upon common law
agency principles). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 & comment c
(1957).
4. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1982) [hereinafter cited as Section 10(b)].
5. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
6. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-06 (1976) (discussing legislative history of Section
10(b)).
7. Langevoort, supra note 1, at 2-3.
8. Id. at 1 n.2.
9. This is also known as the "disclose or refrain" rule. See Brudney, supra note
1, at 1-2. For the development of the rule, see Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73
F. Supp. 798 (D. Del. 1951), discussed in W. CAREY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 3, at
730-32.
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possession of material nonpublic information must either disclose that
information or refrain from trading on such information. 0 In light of
the requirement to read Rule 10b-5 in a flexible manner," the abstain
or disclose rule is in keeping with the broad remedial purposes attrib-
uted to federal securities legislation. 12 Administrative and judicial
application of the abstain or disclose rule in cases of insider trading
leads to a variety of sanctions being applied against a violator, ranging
from restitution to criminal penalties. 13
Despite the existence of this elaborate legal system designed to
prevent insider trading, the public and private opprobrium associated
with such conduct, and the risk of civil or criminal prosecution for
violations of the federal securities laws, cases of insider trading con-
tinue to arise with troublesome frequency. 14 Nor are these cases lim-
ited to one type of individual. From printers 5 to paralegals,' 6 cabinet-
10. Langevoort, supra note 1, at 1.
11. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). For a discussion of the purpose and
policy behind the 1934 Act and Section 10(b), see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 195 (1976) ("[t]he 1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors
against manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon secur-
ities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges");
Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[t]he basic intent of
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 and indeed, of the Exchange Act, is to protect investors
and instill confidence in the securities markets by penalizing unfair dealings");
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir.
1974).
12. See, e.g., Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 186 ("[a] funda-
mental purpose, common to these [securities regulation] statutes, was to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve
a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry").
13. See, e.g., Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L.
REv. 1 (1980); Stalking Stock Trading Abuses, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1981, at D1, col.
3.
14. Dooley, supra note 13, at 10. See Hudson, With Shad as Chief, SEC Eases
Many Rules And Stirs a Big Outcry, Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1984, at 1, col. 6;
Blumstein, Insider Trading Hard to Measure, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1984, at D1, col.
4; Hudson, SEC's Enforcer Runs Tight Ship, but Critics Charge He's Too Soft, Wall
St. J., June 28, 1983, at 1, col. 1; Blumstein, SEC Cracks Down on Insider Trades,
But Violations Are Difficult to Prove, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1980, at 37, col. 4. But
see Branson, Discourse on The Supreme Court Approach to SEC Rule 10b-5 And
Insider Trading, 30 EmoRY L.J. 263, 293-95 (1981). See generally Wolfson, The Need
for Empirical Research in Securities Laws, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 286 (1976).
15. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
16. Kaplan, Firms Alert To Insider Trade Peril, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 23, 1984, at 1,
col. 4.
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level officers17 to corporate directors,18 instances of insider trading
have presented some of the most complex and colorful cases of any
area of the law.
This Note examines recent developments in the law of insider trad-
ing. Part II reviews the information and individuals involved in such
cases, with emphasis on the arguments for and against insider trading.
Part III traces the development of the duty to disclose material non-
public information. Part IV discusses two leading decisions in the area
of insider trading, Chiarella v. United States") and Dirks v. S.E.C.A°
Part V examines potential legislative reform of the statutes currently
regulating insider trading. Part VI discusses future problems in coping
with insider trading. Finally, this Note concludes with the recommen-
dation that a more serious attitude toward such abuses is required by
all parties in conjunction with greater penalties to combat instances of
insider trading. These actions are necessary to achieve the purposes of
the federal securities laws and to promote greater investor confidence
in the securities markets.
II. Information, Actors and the Arguments For and Against Insider
Trading
A. The Nature of the Information
The information involved in insider trading cases may vary as to
both source2' and content. 22 This section will discuss the nature of the
information involved in insider trading and the term "material non-
public information. 23
17. See, e.g., "Inside Traders" Are on the Spot, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan.
16, 1984, at 9, col. 1 (discussing action against former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
Thayer); Hudson, With Shad as Chief, SEC Eases Many Rules And Stirs a Big
Outcry, supra note 14, at 1 (discussing Thayer case); New Crackdown on Insider
Traders, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 5, 1983, at 89, col. 1; Block & Hoff, Life After 'Dirks':
Can Outsider Trading Constitute Fraud?, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 19, 1983, at 1, cols. 3-4
(discussing case of Special Presidential Assistant Thomas C. Reed); Blumstein, In-
sider Trading Hard to Measure, supra note 14, at D1 (discussing Thayer and Reed
cases).
18. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (tip from member of
board of directors of Curtiss-Wright Corporation regarding reduction in company
dividends to broker-dealer who sold Curtiss-Wright stock on basis of tip).
19. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
20. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23.
Generally, the law has been concerned with two types of undisclosed
material information. "Inside information" is a legal term commonly used
[Vol. XII
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1. Corporate and Market Information
An analytical distinction has been drawn between two types of
material nonpublic information-corporate information and market
information.2 4 Corporate information is defined as "information relat-
ing to the intrinsic value of the issuer, primarily its business and
operations. '25 A closer look at corporate information indicates that the
information at issue is often a function of the particular corporation
and its directors, officers and employees. 26
Corporate information may concern the report of decreased earn-
ings for a particular period, 27 the imminent reduction of corporate
dividends, 28 or the discovery of a new mineral deposit. 29 These exam-
ples reflect how traditional instances of corporate information may
form the basis for insider trading. Such examples are not exhaustive,
as the nature of the information will vary with the uniqueness of the
corporation. 30
to describe information concerning a particular corporation and its secur-
ities which is known to the directors, officers and employees and others
associated with the corporation and their "tippees," which is intended to
be available only for "corporate purposes and not for the benefit of any
one" (especially such directors, officers or employees), and which, if dis-
closed, would significantly affect market values. Any other type of undis-
closed information is commonly described as "market information."
Heller, supra note 1, at 522-23; accord Herman, Equity Funding, Inside Information
and the Regulators, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5-12 (1973) (discussing information in-
volved in Dirks case); Langevoort, supra note 1, at 42-44.
24. See supra note 1.
25. Langevoort, supra note 1, at 42. See also Brudney, supra note 1, at 329
("corporate information ... is information which comes from within the corpora-
tion or affects the price of corporate stock because of its reflection of a corporation's
expected earnings or assets") (footnotes omitted).
26. Heller, supra note 1, at 522-23.
27. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974).
28. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
29. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See generally Bromberg, Corporate Information: Texas
Gulf Sulphur and its Implications, 22 Sw. L.J. 731 (1968); Fleischer, Securities
Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf.
Sulphur Proceedings, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271 (1965); Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The
Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule lOb-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63
Nw. U. L. REV. 423 (1968).
30.
Examples of corporate information include knowledge of a significant
discovery of natural resources, a research and development breakthrough,
a rush of new orders, or a potential merger, any of which can be expected
to cause a rise in the price of a corporation's stock upon public disclosure.
Corporate information can also be adverse, such as knowledge of can-
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The other general category of inside information is "market infor-
mation."'" While some commentators have defined this category more
broadly than others, 32 market information generally refers to informa-
tion about events or circumstances which affect the market for a
company's securities but which do not affect the company's assets or
earning power. 33
As with corporate information, market information exists in a vari-
ety of forms. 34 For example, "[i]nformation coming from the bidder in
a planned tender offer is a classic example of market information
relating to the subject company's securities. ' 35 This example indicates
how market information is often unknown to corporate sources, 36
thereby illustrating the distinction between corporate and market
information.
celled orders, nonacceptance of new products, a newly computed decline
in earnings, the passing of a dividend, or the writeoff of a failed venture.
In the latter cases, the corporation's stock price can be expected to decline
once the news reaches the market.
Brudney, supra note 1, at 329 n.31.
31. See supra note 1.
32. Compare Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 1, at 799 and Brud-
ney, supra note 1, at 329 ("[m]arket information concerns transactions in a corpora-
tion's securities that will have an impact on their future price quite apart from
expected changes in the corporation's earnings or assets") with Heller, supra note 1,
at 523 ("[a]ny other type of undisclosed material information is commonly described
as 'market information' ") and Langevoort, supra note 1, at 42 (" 'market' informa-
tion (a residual category of noncorporate information)").
33. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 1, at 799.
34. "Situations involving market information abound. Knowledge that mutual
funds experienced net redemptions over a recent period has affected market prices
generally. In other cases market information affects only the stock of a particular
company." Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 1, at 799. See, e.g., Rogen
v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266 (1st Cir. 1966); Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d
314, 319 (5th Cir. 1959).
Typically such market information is generated by investment advisers,
brokers, authors of market letters, or financial columnists, and is relevant
to transactions anticipating public recommendations or reports by them.
Another kind of market information is that possessed by a person engaged
in the buying and selling of stocks. Thus a broker-dealer who is making a
market, or a floor trader or specialist on an exchange, have information
about supply and demand for shares that is not generally available.
Brudney, supra note 1, at 330 n.32. For a further discussion of such market profes-
sionals and the types of securities in which they deal, see Brudney, supra note 1, at
349; Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 1, at 845-58; Langevoort, supra
note 1, at 39-42.
35. Langevoort, supra note 1, at 42.
36. "Market information need not come from, or indeed be known at all to,
sources 'inside' the enterprise; nor need it reflect knowledge about the company's
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In many cases, market information is also "outside" information
emanating from noncorporate sources. 37 This information may take
the form of a positive or negative recommendation by a broker-
dealer 38 or a financial columnist. 39 Whatever the form, "[o]utside
information, like inside information, can give one group of market
participants an advantage over other participants to whom the infor-
mation is not available. ' 40
One commentator has suggested a third category of information in
addition to corporate and market information. 41 This category in-
cludes information of a more general nature which may nevertheless
have an impact upon a specific corporation or the market as a
whole.42 However, the federal securities laws do not distinguish be-
tween various types of information. 43 The major requirement under
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws is that the infor-
mation be material. 44
worth apart from the short term market effects of a tender offer or a delisting or an
unloading of a block of its stock." Brudney, supra note 1, at 330.
37. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 1, at 807.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 1979)
(financial columnist violated Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 when he failed to reveal to
his readers that he had purchased shares of corporation which he recommended in his
column and that he expected to profit if readers followed his advice).
40. Brudney, supra note 1, at 331.
41. See Brudney, supra note 1, at 331.
42.
[Examples of] still other kinds of information [include] . . . knowledge of
an impending diplomatic shift, war among remote countries, an imminent
scientific discovery, or a research breakthrough by another corporation.
Such information may be external to a particular firm, or indeed have
nothing to do with either the firm's operations or transactions in its secur-
ities and may be acquired legitimately by outsiders.
Brudney, supra note 1, at 331.
43. See Brudney, supra note 1, at 331-32 ("[t]he antifraud provisions by their
terms and by their history do not distinguish between noncorporate and corporate
information or outsiders and insiders") (footnotes omitted); Langevoort, supra note
1, at 42-43 ("[e]ven if there were a bright line distinguishing the two types of
information, nothing in Chiarella suggests that such a distinction should be determi-
native in establishing the liability of insiders and tippees") (footnotes omitted).
44. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444 (1976);
Harkavy v. Apparel Indus., Inc., 571 F.2d 737, 740-41 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 15 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-53 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969). See also Langevoort, supra note 1, at 43 (sole question is whether information
is material; that is, whether it is likely that reasonable investor's decision to trade at
prevailing market price would be affected by disclosure of such information).
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2. Materiality
Rule 10b-545 requires that the information in question be "mate-
rial." 46 The cases defining materiality 7 have utilized the test of
"whether 'a reasonable man would attach importance [to the infor-
mation] . . . in determining his choice of action in the transaction in
question.' -4"s Applying this test, courts have required that the infor-
mation be accurate, specific and of such a nature that it would have a
significant impact upon prices if disclosed. 49 Once the materiality of
the information is shown, reliance on it is generally presumed. 5
B. Insiders, Outsiders and the Duty to Disclose
The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws5 ' make it
unlawful for "any person" to perpetrate a fraud or to make an affirm-
ative misrepresentation concerning securities traded on the capital
markets. 52 Although the reach of the "any person" language would
appear to be clear, a distinction has been drawn between "insiders"
with an express fiduciary relationship to their corporations and "out-
45. See supra note 5.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); SEC v. Monarch
Fund, 608 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1979); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Investors Manage-
ment Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
48. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965), quoted in Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849.
49. Heller, supra note 1, at 526 (footnotes omitted).
50. See Langevoort, supra note 1, at 43 ("[u]sually the information is sufficiently
material that the insider's reliance can be presumed") (footnote omitted); Note, The
Fraud-On-The-Market Theory, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (1982); Note, The
Reliance Requirement In Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 HARV. L. REV.
584, 587 (1975).
However, whether the information is specific or general in nature is important
because
it directly bears upon the level of risk taken by an investor. Certainly the
ability of a court to find a violation of the securities laws diminishes in
proportion to the extent that the disclosed information is so general that
the recipient thereof is still "undertaking a substantial economic risk that
his tempting target will prove to be a 'white elephant.' "
Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d at 942 (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358,
1366-67 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)). For a
further discussion of materiality, see Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 1,
at 803-04; Heller, supra note 1, at 526-32; Herman, supra note 4, at 9-11.
51. See supra notes 4-5.
52. Id.
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siders" 53 who are not directly associated with the corporation in ques-
tion. 54
The existence of a duty to disclose material nonpublic information
under the abstain or disclose rule55 is dependent upon the classification
of the party in question. The first category of individuals governed by
the duty is corporate insiders.56 Insiders such as corporate directors,
officers and employees are barred from trading on material nonpublic
information based upon their fiduciary duty57 to the corporation
which they serve and to its stockholders.58 Allowing such individuals
to profit as a result of their fiduciary duty would be both inequitable
59
and unfair.60
53. Outsider trading has been defined as "trading by persons not associated with
the corporation, based on inside information . Block & Hoff, supra note 17, at
1.
54. See Brudney, supra note 1, at 339-53; Langevoort, supra note 1, at 18-35.
55. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
56. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) ("a special
obligation has been traditionally required of corporate insiders, e.g., officers, direc-
tors and controlling stockholders"). See also Brudney, supra note 1, at 343
("[p]lainly, one group subject to the duties imposed by those [antifraud] provisions,
both as a matter of legislative history and as a matter of traditional law, consists of
corporate insiders-directors, officers, and executive employees") (footnotes omit-
ted).
57. See, e.g., Diamond, 24 N.Y.2d at 497-98; Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70
A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949). See also Langevoort, supra note 1, at 21 n.78 ("fiduciary" is
not subject to precise definition requiring court to determine whether there is expec-
tation of trust and confidence arising from relationship or whether law should
assume such expectation to prevent overreaching).
58. See Diamond, 24 N.Y.2d at 497-98. See also Langevoort, supra note 1, at 20
(insiders acting in agency or quasi-agency capacity with corporate entity as principal
owe fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to corporation and derivatively to its share-
holders).
59.
Here, the basis in equity for the open-market abstain-or-disclose rule is
plain. When an insider buys immediately before the announcement of
good news or sells just before bad, his profit arises by virtue of his fiduciary
status and the resulting access to the nonpublic information that created
the opportunity for low-risk wealth. Requiring public disclosure by the
insider in the open-market situation furthers a significant objective under-
lying the fiduciary disclosure rule-that of preventing unjust enrichment.
Langevoort, supra note 1, at 19.
60.
The insider has acquired from the corporation relevant and material
corporate information and those with whom he deals cannot acquire it
from the corporation lawfully, at least without the corporation's consent,
which the insider has reason to know has not been given and will not be
given. Allowing the insider the informational advantage in dealing with
outsiders is thought to be "unfair," in the language of Cady, Roberts,
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
The reasoning behind the restraints imposed upon corporate in-
siders was expressed in the leading case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co.61
The Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) reasoned that
the disclosure obligations were based upon two principal elements:
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indi-
rectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing. 2 Fine distinctions and rigid classifications should be avoided
when considering these elements under the broad language of the
antifraud provisions.6 3 Rather, the provisions restrict those persons
who have a special relationship with a company and have access to its
internal affairs."4 These persons are subject to correlative duties when
trading in the company's securities. 65 The restraints are justified as
necessary to protect the uninformed from exploitation. 16 Thus, the
corporate insider is prohibited from exploiting his position of trust and
confidence through trading on corporate information at the expense of
unknowing shareholders. 17
In addition to corporate insiders, the corporation itself has been
identified by some commentators as a specific entity to which the duty
of disclosure applies.66 The rationale for prohibiting the corporation
from trading in its own securities based upon inside information is
that "the application of the disclose-or-refrain rule to corporate trans-
actions follows from the same exclusivity of access to the information
which underpins the 'unfairness' of which Cady, Roberts spoke." ' 9
Closely related to those groups with direct ties to the corporation
are individuals serving the corporation in a position of loyalty and
presumably because he has a lawful monopoly on access to the informa-
tion involved. The unfairness is not a function merely of possessing more
information-outsiders may possess more information than other outsiders
by reason of their diligence or zeal-but of the fact that it is an advantage
which cannot be competed away since it depends upon a lawful privilege
to which an outsider cannot acquire access.
Brudney, supra note 1, at 346 (referring to Cady, Roberts, discussed infra at notes
63-74 and accompanying text.
61. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
62. Id. at 912.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Langevoort, supra note 1, at 21.
68. Brudney, supra note 1, at 346-47.
69. Id. at 347 (footnote omitted).
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fidelity, such as lawyers, accountants and financial advisers.70 "While
the delineation of the category 'insider' may be fuzzy at the edges,
there is no doubt that it includes all those normally considered as
having a confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the
enterprise. 71' Thus, in the gray area between insiders and outsiders
there may exist a category of specialists who will have fiduciary
responsibilities imposed upon them under certain circumstances. 72
Finally, certain individuals are "tippees" of insiders, a category
defined as "persons who receive confidential corporate information
from an insider. '73 The tipper-tippee relationship has been a source of
continued discussion7 4 and litigation.75 Much of the difficulty stems
from the fact that "[u]nlike insiders who have independent fiduciary
duties to both the corporation and its shareholders, the typical tippee
has no such relationships. In view of this absence, it has been unclear
how a tippee acquires the Cady, Roberts duty to refrain from trading
on inside information. 7' The current position is that the tippee is
under no such duty unless he knew or should have known of the
insider's breach of his fiduciary relationship. 77
70. See Brudney, supra note 1, at 347-48; Langevoort, supra note 1, at 20-21
(same result should apply to other persons who are serving issuer in capacity that
creates relationship of trust and confidence with company).
71. Brudney, supra note 1, at 348.
72.
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is re-
vealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant
working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply
that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather
that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the con-
duct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information
solely for corporate purposes.
Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14 (1983) (footnotes omitted). See Obermaier,
Insiders, Outsiders, Tippers and Tippees, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 6, 1983, at 2, col. 3.
73. Langevoort, supra note 1, at 24.
74. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 1, at 24-35; Comment, Investors Manage-
ment Company and Rule lOb-5-The Tippee At Bay, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 548
(1972); Note, Investors Management: Institutional Investors as Tippees, 119 U. PA.
L. REv. 502, 506 (1971); Block & Hoff, supra note 17, at 18.
75. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Lum's,
Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); In re Investors Management Co., 44
S.E.C. 633 (1971); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
76. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261 (footnote omitted).
77. "Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation
not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached
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C. The Debate Over Insider Trading
The prohibition against insider trading is an accepted rule in the
legal and business communities. 78 Notwithstanding this acceptance,
debate continues regarding the alleged societal benefits and harms
from insider trading. 79 This section will discuss the traditional position
against insider trading and examine the leading critiques of this
position.
1. The Traditional View of Insider Trading
The policy behind the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act is "to
protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through regula-
tion of transactions upon securities exchanges and in the over-the-
counter markets, and to impose regular reporting requirements on
companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges."80
The rationale for this policy is both pragmatic and equitable. From a
pragmatic viewpoint, investors may be deterred from participating in
the market if they know that others are trading on nonpublic informa-
tion-the average investor would feel that the odds are stacked
against him."' In terms of equity, the insider is barred from profiting
from his position of trust and confidence.8 2 The resulting system is
intended to encourage individual investor participation in the secur-
his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and
the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach." Id. at 3264 (footnote
omitted). See also In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 651 (1971) (tippee
responsibility must be related back to insider responsibility by necessary finding that
tippee knew information was given to him in breach of duty by person having special
relationship to issuer not to disclose information and that information must be shown
not only to have been material and nonpublic but also to have substantially contrib-
uted to trading that resulted).
78. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966);
Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 720;
Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547 (1970);
Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock
Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967); Longstreth, Halting Insider Trading, N.Y.
Times, April 12, 1984, at A27, col. 1; Bonner, A Kind Word For Insiders, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 21, 1984, at D2, col. 1; SEC, Professor Split on Insider Trades, Wall St.
J., Mar. 2, 1984, at 12, col. 3; Kaplan, And 'Now, a Word in Favor of Insider
Trading, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 23, 1984, at 26, col. 1.
80. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
81. Wang, supra note 1, at 1227.
82. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 1, at 18-24; Brudney, supra note 1, at 343-
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ities markets and to prosecute trading abuses based upon inside infor-
mation.8
3
2. The Case for Insider Trading
The arguments in favor of allowing insider trading may be roughly
divided into two categories: first, those which maintain that there are
inherent benefits to insider trading, or at the very least that no one is
harmed by such activity, and second, those which assert that the
inadequacy of the present structure prohibiting insider trading man-
dates that the current system be reorganized.
In the first category, the argument is made that removing prohibi-
tions against insider trading would act as an incentive for corporate
executives to create favorable conditions for their corporation's secur-
ities which they would then be able to exploit as investors.8 4 Under
this theory, insider trading becomes both an incentive and an alter-
nate form of compensation for corporate entrepreneurs.8 5
Alternatively, the argument is advanced that "[iln anonymous stock
trading, insider trading probably directly harms no one individual."86
If an individual investor would have participated in a particular trade
regardless of the insider's activity, then it is argued that no causal
relationship exists between the outside investor's loss and the insider's
gain. 87
Insider trading is also advocated as a mechanism to increase the
efficiency of the capital markets in determining the most accurate
price for a given corporation's securities.8 8 "Presumably, by allowing
83.
Those executives, or securities industry professionals or others in a position
to act on inside information, can and should owe allegiance to the secur-
ities marketplace. The priority that the removal of insider trading restric-
tions would give them would impugn investor confidence in their ability to
participate in the markets. Maintenance of broad participation in capital
markets gives corporate enterprise, corporate officials, securities profes-
sionals, institutional investors, and, indeed, financial printers both the
ability to provide goods and services to earn livelihoods. Allowing insiders
to trade would provide them with short run benefits at a potentially much
greater long term personal cost.
Branson, supra note 14, at 292.
84. Id. at 291-92.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 295. See also Dooley, supra note 13, at 33 (insider trading does not
induce outsider's trades nor does it mislead him or affect his expectations in any
way).
87. Branson, supra note 14, at 295.
88. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 857 (1983); Heller, supra note 1, at 520-26; Note, The Efficient Capital Market
1984]
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insider trading, securities laws will ensure that insiders will quickly
move prices to the proper levels."89 The resolution of this particular
argument requires a determination of whether market efficiency or
investor protection should be the underlying goal of securities regula-
tion.90 For example, a corporation developing a new product which is
subject to governmental approval may receive advance notice that
such approval will be denied, a decision that would adversely affect
the price of the corporation's securities when made public. By permit-
ting corporate insiders to sell their stock based on such information,
the securities markets would begin to incorporate the adverse decision
by setting a lower, more accurate stock price. Potential investors in
the corporation may be dissuaded from purchasing the stock as a
result of the price movement initiated by the insider trading. 91
In the second category of arguments favoring insider trading,
commentators have observed that attempts to regulate insider trading
have proven to be ineffective.92 One commentator has stated that
"enforcement by any means of insider trading restrictions is a bank-
rupt idea because enforcement attempts to curb an incurbable ele-
ment of human nature. 9 3 While such observations concerning human
nature may have validity, 4 disagreement over both the extent of
insider trading and the efficacy of enforcement provisions is expected
to continue. 5
III. The Development of the Duty to Disclose
Much of the law of insider trading is an outgrowth of the Securities
and Exchange Commission's analysis in the case of In re Cady, Ro-
berts & Co.96 Between the decision in Cady, Roberts and the more
recent cases of Chiarella97 and Dirks,9 however, a number of signifi-
Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29
STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977).
89. Branson, supra note 14, at 292.
90. See Brudney, supra note 1, at 336.
91. Cf. Bonner, Searle Stock Query Held 'Smokescreen,' N.Y. Times, Feb. 29,
1984, at D5, col. 1 (scientist traded on company's stock expecting price decrease to
result from negative reports concerning company's new artificial sweetener which
scientist had criticized).
92. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 14, at 293; Dooley, supra note 13, at 72.
93. Branson, supra note 14, at 293.
94. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
96. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See supra notes 61-77 and accompanying text.
97. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
98. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
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cant decisions intervened. These intervening cases illustrate the devel-
opment of the duty to disclose material nonpublic information. They
also provide indispensable perspective for the decisions in Chiarella
and Dirks.
Although much commentary on the subject begins with the Cady,
Roberts decision, note should be taken of early common law cases
which dealt with insider trading.9 In these cases, the plaintiff usually
attempted to extend the tort of misrepresentation to reach material
nondisclosures of corporate information in transactions involving an
official of the corporation.100 Where a duty was imposed on the
corporate official either on a fiduciary duty'0' or special facts10 2 basis,
courts often granted rescission of the transaction as the appropriate
remedy. 0 3 The early common law decisions helped to establish the
fiduciary relationship between the corporate insider and the corpora-
tion's stockholders.' 0 4
The Commission's decision in Cady, Roberts'0 5 relied on statutory
provisions rather than common law in declaring that insider trading
violated section 10(b)106 and Rule lOb-5. 10 7 The case involved a tip
from a director of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation concerning a divi-
dend reduction by the board of directors which was given to a partner
of a securities firm.' 08 Based on the corporate information, the partner
sold Curtiss-Wright stock for the benefit of his clients.' 09 The Commis-
99. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283
Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kans. 530, 16 P.2d 531
(1932). For discussions of these cases, see Brudney, Insider Securities Dealings During
Corporate Crises, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1962); Conant, Duties of Disclosure of
Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53 (1960); Comment,
The Prospects for Rule X-1OB-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59
YALE L.J. 1120 (1950).
100. Langevoort, supra note 1, at 4-5.
101. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
102. See Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903).
103. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
104. "While these holdings were not universally accepted, they clearly indicated a
trend ... toward treating the insider as a fiduciary for the shareholders as well as for
the company." Langevoort, supra note 1, at 5 (footnotes omitted). See W. CARY & M.
EISENBERGC, supra note 3, at 713-18; Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 986 (1957); Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 725
(1956).
105. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). By its own language, the Commission recognized
Cady, Roberts as "a case of first impression and one of signal importance in our
administration of the Federal securities acts." Id.
106. See supra note 4.
107. See supra note 5.
108. 40 S.E.C. at 908-10.
109. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
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sion's analysis was based on "first, the existence of a relationship
giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit
of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing."110 Thus, Cady, Roberts went beyond the
fiduciary rationale and the special facts doctrine expressed in the
common law decisions"' and established a broader approach under
Rule 10b-5 for dealing with cases of insider trading.12
Following the Cady, Roberts decision, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit recognized the Commission's reasoning in Cady, Ro-
berts as the "essence" of Rule 10b-5.11 3 In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co. ,I14 the Second Circuit reviewed the history of the antifraud provi-
sions and concluded that "[w]hether predicated on traditional fiduci-
ary concepts . . . or on the 'special facts' doctrine, . . . the Rule is
based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities market-
place that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have rela-
tively equal access to material information." '" 5 As a result, anyone
110. 40 S.E.C. at 912 (footnote omitted).
111. See supra notes 99-103.
112. 40 S.E.C. at 913-14.
Whatever distinctions may have existed at common law based upon the
view that an officer or director may stand in a fiduciary relationship to
existing shareholders from whom he purchases but not to members of the
public to whom he sells, it is clearly not appropriate to introduce these
things into the broader anti-fraud concepts embodied in the securities acts.
Id. (footnote omitted). See Langevoort, supra note 1, at 7-9; Note, Whistle Blowing
as a Rule 10b-5 Violation: Dirks v. SEC, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 987, 992 (1982);
Comment, The Dutiful Relationships of Section 10(b): The Chiarella Decisions, 42
U. PITT. L. REV. 637, 640-41 (1981).
113. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (quoting Cady, Roberts).
The essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own account in
the securities of a corporation has "access, directly or indirectly, to infor-
mation intended to be available for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone" may not take "advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing," i.e. the
investing public.
Id. The case involved the purchase of corporate stock by company officials based
upon material information, specifically the discovery of copper deposits not yet
disclosed to the public. See also SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus.,
Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
114. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
115. Id. at 848. For more on the "access to information" approach, see supra note
60 and Brudney, supra note 1, at 353-55.
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possessing material nonpublic information would be required either to
disclose the information or to abstain from trading on the information
while it remained nonpublic.1 6
After establishing the basis for insider liability in the Cady, Roberts
and Texas Gulf Sulphur decisions, courts were increasingly faced with
the tipper-tippee relationship and the problem of outsider liabil-
ity.117 In the case of In re Investors Management Co.," 8 the Commis-
sion determined that the antifraud provisions of Rule lOb-5 applied to
the tippees of corporate insiders." 9 In such cases, the SEC concluded
that "the appropriate test in that regard is whether the recipient knew
or had reason to know that the information was non-public and had
been obtained improperly by selective revelation or otherwise.' 20
In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,' 21 the
Second Circuit held that the tippee defendants were liable in money
116. 401 F.2d at 848. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Langevoort, supra note 1, at 9; Note,
supra note 112, at 992; Comment, supra note 112, at 642-43.
117. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
118. 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971). Investors Management involved the sale of shares in
Douglas Aircraft Company based upon a report of substantially reduced earnings not
yet public. See also Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 1, at 806-07; Note,
supra note 112, at 933.
119.
We consider that one who obtains possession of material, non-public
corporate information, which he has reason to know emanates from a
corporate source, and which by itself places him in a position superior to
other investors, thereby acquires a relationship with respect to that infor-
mation within the purview and restraints of the antifraud provisions. Both
elements are here present as they were in the Cady, Roberts case. When a
recipient of such corporate information, knowing or having reason to
know that the corporate information is non-public, nevertheless uses it to
effect a transaction in the corporation's securities for his own benefit, we
think his conduct cannot be viewed as free of culpability under any sound
interpretation or application of the antifraud provisions.
44 S.E.C. at 644.
120. 44 S.E.C. at 643. Concurring in the result, Commissioner Smith would have
framed the . . . test in terms of the respondents knowing or having reason
to know that the material non-public information became available to
them in breach of a duty owed to the corporation not to disclose or use the
information for non-corporate purposes. Such knowledge, in effect, ren-
ders the tippee a participant in the breach of duty when he acts on the
basis of the information received.
Id. at 650 (footnote omitted).
121. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). Shapiro involved the disclosure of material
nonpublic information regarding an expected decrease in earnings for the Douglas
Aircraft Company. While preparing an underwriting of Douglas debentures, Merrill
Lynch disclosed the information to a preferred group of institutional clients (the
1984]
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damages for violating the abstain-or-disclose rule. 122 The case imposed
liability on tippees in the same manner as insiders had earlier been
held liable under the antifraud provisions.12 3 In addition, Shapiro
determined the proper class of investors who could recover in such
actions. The proper plaintiffs were those individuals who purchased
securities between the time of defendants' trading on the inside infor-
mation and the time of disclosure of the material information.124
These cases are indicative of the early decsions on insider trading.
By applying the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws to
different factual situations involving insiders, outsiders, tippers and
tippees, the lower courts began to develop a body of law dealing
uniquely with insider trading. This early progression of the law of
insider trading would soon undergo a major transformation as a result
of the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella v. United States.12s
IV. Chiarella and Dirks: The Twin Pillars of the Law of Insider
Trading
A. Chiarella v. United States
Vincent Chiarella, an employee of a financial printer which pro-
duced confidential documents relating to corporate takeover bids,
purchased shares of stock in companies about to be acquired through
selling defendants) who knew or should have known that the information had not
been publicly announced. Based on this information, the selling defendants then sold
Douglas stock prior to Douglas' public disclosure of the revised earnings estimates.
Id. at 231-34.
122. Id. at 237.
123. 495 F.2d at 237-38.
We are not persuaded by the selling defendants' argument that as tippees
they were not able to make effective public disclosure of information
about a company with which they were not associated; for the duty
imposed is not a naked one to disclose, but a duty to abstain from trading
unless they do disclose. Since upon the admitted facts before us the selling
defendants knew or should have known of the confidential corporate
source of the revised earnings information and they knew of its non-public
nature, they were under a duty not to trade in Douglas stock without
publicly disclosing such information.
id.
124. Id. at 241. But see Elkind v. Ligget & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir.
1980) (measure of damages in tipper liability case limited to tippee's profits); Fridrich
v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977)
(plaintiff class may not recover damages without showing of actual injury caused by
defendant's conduct).
125. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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tender offers prior to public announcement of the offers. 26 Chiarella
acquired this material nonpublic information by deciphering the
codes used by his employer to mask the identity of the corporations
involved in the takeover proceedings. 27 Such conduct was prohibited
by his employer, 128 and Chiarella knew of the restrictions. 2 9 After
purchasing shares in the target companies without disclosing the ma-
terial information, Chiarella waited for the announcement of the
takeover attempts and sold immediately thereafter, reaping a substan-
tial profit. 3 0
Chiarella was convicted on seventeen counts 131 of violating section
10(b) of the 1934 Act 132 and SEC Rule 10b-5. 3 3 His criminal convic-
tion was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,134
which reasoned that the abstain-or-disclose rule 135 barred Chiarella
from trading on material nonpublic information obtained in the
course of his employment as a financial printer.136 The court of ap-
peals based this position on the test of whether an individual regularly
received or had access 31 to material nonpublic information, 38 regard-
126. Id. at 224.
127. Id.
128. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445
U.S. 222 (1980).
129. 445 U.S. at 224.
130. In the course of five transactions (four tender offers and one merger) covering
a fourteen month period, Chiarella's profits amounted to just over $30,000, which he
agreed to return to the sellers of the shares. Id. See Langevoort, supra note 1, at 11-
12; Heller, supra note 1, at 532-35; Branson, supra note 14, at 271-75; Comment,
supra note 112, at 638-40.
131. SEC v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
132. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
134. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd. 445 U.S. 222
(1980).
135. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
136. 588 F.2d at 1368. See Langevoort, supra note 1, at 12; Note, Rule 10b-5:
Birth of the Concept of Market Insider and Its Application in a Criminal Case-
United States v. Chiarella, 8 FOROHAM URB. L.J. 467 (1980); Note, Nontraditional
Corporate Insiders in Possession of Material Inside Information Have a Duty Either
to Disclose the Inside Information or to Abstain From Trading in the Corporation's
Stock: United States v. Chiarella, 47 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 965 (1979); Comment,
Rationalizing Liability for Nondisclosure Under 10b-5: Equal Access to Information
and United States v. Chiarella, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 162.
137. 588 F.2d at 1365. "Anyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly re-
ceives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in
securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose. And if he cannot disclose,
he must abstain from from buying or selling." Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in
original). For a further discusion of "access to information," see supra note 60 and
accompanying text.
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less of whether the individual was a corporate insider. 39 Although
Chiarella was not an insider of the companies whose securities he
traded, his employment gave him regular access to confidential infor-
mation. 40 This access formed the basis for the finding of liability by
the Second Circuit.' 4'
The Supreme Court reversed Chiarella's conviction, 42 rejecting the
"access to information" approach and instead requiring that liability
under section 10(b) be "premised upon a duty to disclose [material
nonpublic information] arising from a relationship of trust and confi-
dence between parties to a transaction."'' 43 Given that Chiarella was
not a corporate insider 44 and was not acting in a position of trust and
confidence toward the sellers of the securities, 45 his use of the confi-
dential information could not have constituted a fraud under section
10(b). 46 While Chiarella's conduct may have been unfair in relation
to other shareholders, the Court concluded that "not every instance of
financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under [Section] 10
(b) -147
While the Court in Chiarella reaffirmed that section 10(b) is a
"catchall" provision, 48 it emphasized that "what it catches must be
138. 588 F.2d at 1365.
139. Id.
140. 588 F.2d at 1364. For more on the "market insider" concept, see supra note
137 and accompanying text.
141. 588 F.2d at 1365-68. See Langevoort, supra note 1, at 11-12.
142. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
143. Id. at 230. See Langevoort, supra note 1, at 12-13; Comment, supra note
112, at 639-40.
144. 445 U.S. at 231.
145. Id. at 232-33.
No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with the sellers of the
target company's securities, for petitioner had no prior dealings with
them. He was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person
in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact,
a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal
market transactions.
Id.
146. Id. at 233.
We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general
duty between all participants in market transactions to forego actions
based on material, nonpublic information. Formulation of such a broad
duty, which departs radically from the established doctrine that duty
arises from a specific relationship between two parties, . . . should not be
undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent.
id.
147. Id. at 232.
148. Id. at 226.
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fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there
can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.' 149 Consequently, Chiarella's
conviction could not be upheld based on his mere acquisition of
nonpublic information. 
50
B. Dirks v. S.E. C.
In Dirks v. S.E.C.,' 51 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the position
taken in Chiarella that the duty to disclose material nonpublic infor-
mation arises from the existance of a relationship between the parties
to the transaction, not from the ability to acquire confidential infor-
mation based on the position one occupies. 5 2 The case involved the
disclosure of material nonpublic information in the form of fraudulent
corporate practices within Equity Funding of America, a corporation
engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds. 53 The disclosures
were made by Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding, 54
to Raymond Dirks, a broker-dealer who provided investment analysis
of the securities of insurance companies to institutional investors. 55
Based on this information, Dirks conducted an investigation of
Equity Funding 5 6 and discovered that its corporate assets were vastly
149. Id. at 235.
150. Id. at 235.
We hold that a duty to disclose under [section 10(b)] does not arise from
the mere possession of nonpublic information. The contrary result is with-
out support in the legislative history of [section 10(b)] and would be
inconsistent with the careful plan that Congress has enacted for regulation
of the securities markets.
Id. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-79 (1977).
In Part IV of the opinion, the Court refused to consider Chiarella's liability under
a "misappropriation" theory, namely that Chiarella had breached a duty to the
acquiring corporation when he traded upon information obtained as an employee of
a financial printer retained by the corporation. This refusal was based upon the
failure to submit this theory to the jury in the lower court proceeding. 445 U.S. at
235-37. See Langevoort, supra note 1, at 14-16; Comment, supra note 112, at 639-40.
151. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983). See Block & Hoff, supra note 17, at 18; Note, supra
note 112, at 987-90. For the prior history of the case, see Dirks v. S.E.C., 681 F.2d
824, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Boston Co. Inst'al Investors, Inc., 1978 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 81,705.
152. 103 S. Ct. at 3263.
153. Id. at 3258.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 103 S. Ct. 3259. Dirks' investigation included an attempt to persuade the
Wall Street Journal to publish an article on the fraud allegations. Such an article was
eventually published based upon the information gathered by Dirks, but only after
the SEC filed a complaint against Equity Funding. Id.
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overstated. 15 During Dirks' investigation the price of Equity Funding
stock began to fall, 158 ultimately causing the New York Stock Ex-
change to suspend trading in the stock.159 The corporation soon went
into receivership. 16 0 Prior to this occurrence, however, some of Dirks'
clients and other institutional investors sold their shares of Equity
Funding based on their discussions with Dirks regarding the corporate
improprieties, thereby avoiding further financial loss.' 6 '
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Dirks6 2 by restating the
traditional view first expressed in Cady, Roberts'3 and later adopted
in Chiarella.6 4 The Court stated that a Rule 10b-5 violation is predi-
cated upon a showing of the existence of a relationship affording
access to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take
advantage of such information without public disclosure. 65 In addi-
tion, a Rule 10b-5 violation requires some form of "manipulation or
deception," which in an insider trading case derives from the inherent
unfairness of permitting an insider to trade in corporate information
for his own personal benefit. 66
Unlike corporate insiders, however, the typical "tippee" lacks any
specific relationship with or fiduciary obligation to the corporation or
its shareholders. 6 7 In consideration of Chiarella's finding that a duty
to disclose is the basis for liability under section 10(b), 168 it has been
unclear how a tippee acquires a duty to abstain from trading on inside
information absent a fiduciary or other special relationship.169
157. Id. at 3258-59.
158. Id. at 3258.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 3259.
161. Id. See Block & Hoff, supra note 17, at 18. For his role in the proceedings,
Dirks was censured by the SEC for aiding and abetting violations of Rule 10b-5 by
repeating the information he had discovered to investors who were likely to sell their
shares of Equity Funding based upon such information. His petition for review of the
SEC's action was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 103
S. Ct. at 3259-60.
162. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
163. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
164. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
165. 103 S. Ct. at 3260.
166. Id. at 3261 (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473
(1973)).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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The Court resolved this issue by stating that "some tippees must
assume an insider's duty to the shareholders not because they receive
inside information, but rather because it has been made available to
them improperly."'170 The disclosure by the insider to the tippee is
improper only where it would violate the insider's duty under Cady,
Roberts.'7 1 "Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the sharehold-
ers of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information
only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the share-
holders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee
knows or should know that there has been a breach.' ' 72
Finally, the Court examined those circumstances under which an
insider's tip would breach his fiduciary duty, thereby forming the
basis for the tippee's derivative breach. 73 The Court stated that "the
test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indi-
rectly, from his disclosure."' 74 Under such a standard, the Court
concluded that Dirks did not violate the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws given his lack of a fiduciary relationship with
Equity Funding and its shareholders. 175 Furthermore, those corporate
officials who disclosed the scandal to Dirks did not violate their Cady,
Roberts duty176 because they were motivated by a desire to expose the
fraud and received no personal benefit in return for their disclosure of
the information. 177
170. Id. at 3264 (emphasis in original).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 3265.
174. Id. "Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of dutv to stock-
holders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach." id.
(footnote omitted).
175. Id. at 3266-67.
176. Id. at 3267-68.
177. Id. For other recent developments in the law of insider trading, see, e.g.,
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W.
3266 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1983) (No. 82-1653); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.
1983); Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v.
Thayer, 84 Civ. 66 (CES) (S.D.N.Y. 1984); SEC v. Musella, 83 Civ. 342 (CSH)
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983); SEC v. Platt,
565 F. Supp. 1244 (W.D. Okla. 1983); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 553 F. Supp. 1347
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp.
1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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V. Proposals For Reform
Several commentators have criticized the current system of prevent-
ing insider trading178 and have called for a legislative augmentation of
current statutory provisions regulating trading abuses in the securities
markets.179 This process has been accelerated as a result of the Dirks
decision'"0 and the recent increase in the number of allegations filed
by the SEC against public figures for insider trading activities.','
One suggested reform is the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1983,182 approved by the House of Representatives in September,
178.
A review of the current regulatory scheme indicates that to be effective,
enforcement must be quiet, swift and sure. Furthermore, it must be
substantial and real, universal in application, and based upon principles
more definite than the duty to the marketplace. The current scheme is
noisy, random, slow-moving, and vague, thus resulting in a lack of suffi-
cient deterrence. Furthermore, it is counterproductive and promotes a
lack of investor confidence.
Branson, supra note 14, at 301. See also Illegal Insider Trading Seems to Be on Rise;
Ethics Issues Muddled, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
179. See, e.g., FED. SEC. CODE § 1603 (1980); Block & Hoff, supra note 17, at 23-
24; Branson, supra note 14, at 301-03; Langevoort, supra note 1, at 52-53 (perhaps
best solution is legislative revision along lines of Federal Securities Code to remove
prohibition from its uneasy fraud base); Wang, supra note 1, at 1320-21.
180. See Obermaier, Insiders, Outsiders, Tippers and Tippees, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 6,
1983, at 1, col. 1; Karmel, The Efficient Market and "Dirks v. SEC, " N.Y.L.J., Aug.
18, 1983, at 1, col. 1; Brodsky, Trading on Inside Information, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 17,
1983, at 1, col. 1.
181. See supra note 17. See also Metz, Use of Inside Data in the Takeover Game Is
Pervasive and Can Lead to Huge Profit, Wall St. J., Mar. 2. 1984, at 12, col. 6.
Media Policies Vary on Preventing Employees and Others From Profiting on Knowl-
edge of Future Business Stories, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1984, at 12, col. 1.
182. The provisions of the bill relevant to insider trading read as follows:
A bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to increase the
sanctions against trading in securities while in possession of material non-
public information.
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as "The Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1983."
SECTION 2. Section 21 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended
by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (d)(1), and adding at the end
thereof the following new paragraph:
(2)(A) Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has
violated any provision of this title or the rules or regulations thereunder by
purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material nonpublic
information in a transaction (A)(i) on or through the facilities of a national
securities exchange or from or through a broker or dealer, and (B)(ii)
which is not part of a public offering by an issuer of securities other than
standardized options, the Commission may bring action in a United States
District Court to seek, and the court shall have jurisdiction to impose, a
civil penalty to be paid by such a person, or any person aiding or abetting
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1983.183 In its present form, the Act would substantially increase both
civil 8 4 and criminal 8 5 penalties for insider trading. 86 To the extent
the violation of such person. The amount of such penalty shall be deter-
mined by the court in light of the facts and circumstances, but shall not
exceed three times the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of such
unlawful purchase or sale, and shall be payable into the Treasury of the
United States. If a person upon whom such a penalty is imposed shall fail
to pay such penalty within the time prescribed in the court's order, the
Commission may refer the matter to the Attorney General who may
recover such penalty by action in the appropriate United States District
Court. The actions authorized by this paragraph may be brought in
addition to any other actions that the Commission or the Attorney General
are entitled to bring. For purposes of Section 27 of this title, actions under
this paragraph shall be actions to enforce a liability or a duty created by
this title. The Commission, by rule or regulation, may exempt from the
provisions of this paragraph any class of persons or transactions.
(B) No person shall be subject to a sanction under this subsection (d)(2)
solely because that person aided and abetted a transaction covered by it in
a manner other than by communicating material nonpublic information.
Section 20 of this title shall not apply to actions brought under this
subsection (d)(2). No person shall be liable under this subsection (d)(2)
solely by reason of employing another person who is liable under such a
subsection.
(C) For the purposes of this subsection (d)(2), "profit gained" or "loss
avoided" is the difference between the purchase or sale price of the secur-
ity and the value of that security as measured by the trading price of the
security a reasonable period after public dissemination of the nonpublic
information.
(D) No action may be brought under this subsection (d)(2) more than
five years after the purchase or sale. This provision shall not be construed
to bar or limit in any manner any action by the Commission or the
Attorney General under any provision of this title, nor shall it bar or limit
in any manner any action to recover penalties, or to seek any other order
regarding penalties imposed in an action commenced within five years of
such transaction.
SECTION 3. Section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended
by striking "$10,000" from subsection (a) and inserting in lieu thereof
"$100,000".
SECTION 4. The amendments made by this Act shall become effective
immediately upon enactment of this Act.
H.R. 559, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
For a discussion of the Act, see Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement
Legislation: Hearings on H.559 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Con-
sumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Middleton, Insider Trading, 69 A.B.A.J. 1613 (1983); Ober-
maier, supra note 180, at 2.
183. House Approves Bill to Increase Penalty For Insider Trading, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 20, 1983, at 3, col. 2.
184. Id. More specifically, the language of the Act states that
the Commission may bring action in a United States District Court to seek,
and the court shall have jurisdiction to impose, a civil penalty to be paid
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that the legislation goes beyond present remedies which merely re-
quire restitution of gains made as a result of trading on inside informa-
tion, the Act is a significant contribution toward making insider trad-
ing a much more perilous activity.187
Although the Act would provide enhanced sanctions both to deter
and to prosecute insider traders, 88 the legislation has been subjected
to a variety of criticisms. 189 One objection is that in its current form
the Act does not contain any specific definition of precisely what
activities constitute insider trading. 90 In fact, the SEC was opposed to
incorporating any such definition into the legislation.' 91 The Commis-
sion's reasoning for this position was based upon the difficulties in-
volved in drafting a comprehensive definition of insider trading.9 2
Critics argue that the Act is fundamentally misdirected to the extent
that it fails to deal with the unfair use of material information by
outsiders. 93 In their view, the problem of outsider trading requires its
by such a person, or any person aiding or abetting the violation of such
person. The amount of such penalty shall be determined by the court in
light of the facts and circumstances, but shall not exceed three times the
profit gained or the loss avoided as a result of such unlawful purchase or
sale, and shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States.
See supra note 182. The Act defines "profit gained or loss avoided" as "the difference
between the purchase or sale price of the security and the value of that security as
measured by the trading price of the security a reasonable period after public
dissemination of the nonpublic information." Id. But see SEC v. MacDonald, 699
F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983) (price a reasonable time after dissemination of information
defined profit to be disgorged for insider trading).
185. The Act would increase criminal fines for insider trading violations from
$10,000 to $100,000. See supra note 182.
186. Middleton, supra note 182, at 1613.
187. "The rationale for that legislation, which provides for treble civil penalties, is
valid because under current law the only sanctions are disgourgement of profits and
an injunction. Accordingly, there is no downside to violating the insider trading
prohibitions." Block & Hoff, supra note 17, at 23. See Block, Insider Trading Bill
Raises Difficult Questions, N.Y.L.J., June 6, 1983, at 25, col. 1.
188. See supra notes 183-86.
189. See, e.g., Middleton, supra note 182, at 1613; Obermaier, supra note 180, at
2.
190. Obermaier, supra note 180, at 2.
191. 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1337 (BNA) (July 15, 1983). See Obermaier, supra
note 180, at 2.
192. 15 SEC. REc. & L. REP. 1563 (BNA) (Aug. 12, 1983). See Obermaier, supra
note 180, at 2.
193. "[L]egislation dealing with outsider trading is necessary, but.., it should be
defined as such and not come under the catchall 'insider trading,' which the SEC
calls fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule
10b-5." Middleton, supra note 182, at 1613.
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own independent legislative remedy. 19 4 In addition, commentators
have observed that the result of Chiarella19 5 and Dirks'98 may be to
move away from section 10 (b) as the traditional remedy for securities
laws violations.19 7 The ultimate conclusion may be the further limita-
tion of present regulatory provisions through judicial restrictions'
without legislative development of sufficient alternatives to augment
or replace the existing statutory framework. 10
Furthermore, critics charge that to use legislation entitled the "In-
sider Trading Sanctions Act" to prosecute cases of outsider trading
would result in either a mislabeling of the Act 200 or in its misapplica-
tion to a theoretically different problem, which is based on unfairness
rather than fraud.2 0 1 Increasing the penalties for insider trading and
then attempting to apply such legislation to the problem of outsider
trading, critics argue, would only prescribe the wrong remedy for a
related, yet distinct, problem. In order to avoid such confusion, one
suggested approach to the problems raised by outsider trading is "not
simply sanctions, because sanctions cannot be imposed where there is
194. Id.
195.
The likely effect of Dirks will be to undermine the use of [Section] 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 as effective vehicles to combat outsider trading on inside
information. Both Chiarella and Dirks now demonstrate that [Section]
10(b) may not be the appropriate statutory predicate to combat trading on
inside information by outsiders.
Block & Hoff, supra note 17, at 23 (footnotes omitted). See Sporkin, Setback to SEC's
Enforcement Drive, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1983, at F2, col. 3; Pitt & Aim, 'Dirks'
Deals Blow to Insider Trading Program, LEGAL TIMEs OF WASH., July 11, 1983, at
13.
196. See Block & Barton, Securities Litigation, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 350 (1983).
197. Block & Hoff, supra note 17, at 23.
198. See, e.g., Block & Barton, supra note 197, at 371-73 (discussing proposed
legislation based upon regulation of unfair trading).
199. Middleton, supra note 182, at 1613.
200.
[W]hile increased sanctions are a potent response, the legislation fails to go
to the root of the problem. The courts have interpreted [Section] 10(b) as
proscribing fraud by corporate insiders and those who knowingly trade on
the information received from insiders who have breached their duty to
their corporation and its shareholders. Outsider trading on inside informa-
tion, however, is not fraud because the traditional elements of fraud-
e.g., duty, misrepresentation and deception-are absent. The prohibition
on outsider trading based on inside information is rather a judicially
created concept grounded more on notions of fairness than on the specific
activities outlawed by [Section] 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Block & Hoff, supra note 17, at 24.
201. Id.
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no liability .... What is needed, therefore, is legislation that specifi-
cally addresses the issue of outsider trading. 20 2
Such legislation would add to the remedies already proposed in the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act, yet it would be specifically designed to
cope with the problem of outsider trading. "The legislation should
clarify the policy to be vindicated and should set forth who is pre-
cluded and the conduct from which they are precluded."2 0 3 The policy
behind such legislation should be to maintain investor confidence in
the securities markets204 and to remove the impression that "some
people play the market with marked cards and deal bad hands to
honest investors.- 20 5
VI. Present Issues and Future Prospects
Securities trading violations based upon the fraudulent or unfair use
of material nonpublic information have confronted the legal and
business communities with serious legal and ethical questions. Given
the increasing variety of securities available20 and the new methods
by which they may be traded, 20 7 the potential for violations, if not
202. Id.
203. Id.
204.
Congress should expressly articulate that the underlying policies of such
legislation [are] that it is unfair to trade on inside information and that the
integrity of the capital markets must be protected. The legislation should
make it unlawful to trade based on material non-public information. The
legislation should also articulate an intent standard and should provide
express exceptions to liability to reflect, among other things, the Supreme
Court's proper rejection of the notion that there should be equal access to
investment information as undesirable and impractical. Thus, the focus of
the legislation would not be on fraud, but rather on unfair trading.
id.
205. Middleton, supra note 182, at 1613.
206.
The S.E.C.'s headaches do not end with [stock or] stock options. Trading
in futures and options on "subindexes" of just a few stocks is on the verge of
taking off, providing new opportunities for insider trading. Various ex-
changes have made proposals to the S.E.C. to trade some 60 options on
subindexes. Meanwhile, the commission has opposed futures on four stock
subindexes proposed by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, in part out of
the fear of insider trading.
Blumstein, Insider Trading Hard to Measure, supra note 14, at D5.
207. "Taming insider trading is increasingly difficult because of the growing ways
to trade on private information. Not only can people buy and sell stock, but in many
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actual cases of abuse, is almost certain to increase in the future.208
In response to these developments, the legal and business communi-
ties will be faced with a number of important choices. The most
fundamental is whether to continue to prohibit insider trading, 20 9 or
instead to follow the course advocated by certain commentators210 and
allow trading on material nonpublic information as a device to in-
crease the efficiency of the capital markets. 211 While many arguments
have been made in favor of the efficiency approach, 212 the underlying
purposes of the federal securities laws 213 preclude sacrificing the integ-
rity of the securities markets and the faith of the individual investor in
those markets on the basis of efficiency alone. 21 4
Presuming that the prohibitions on insider trading will remain, the
legal and business communities, working in conjunction, should adopt
a two-part approach to keep trading abuses at the lowest possible
level. On one level, greater legal sanctions are necessary to deter and,
if the need arises, to prosecute those who use their positions of trust
and confidence for personal profit. On this level, legislation such as
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act 21 5 and proposals for further legisla-
tion dealing with the problem of outsider trading2 6 are indispensable
weapons in the arsenal of those charged with the enforcement of the
federal securities laws. Such enactments, however, will be unsuccess-
ful unless those charged with their enforcement maintain a high
degree of vigilance in identifying and prosecuting transgressors.
cases, they can sell options on stock, whose prices tend to move even more dramati-
cally than the underlying shares."Id.
208. Id.
209. See Heller, supra note 1, at 520-26; Note, The Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis, Economic Theory, and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29
STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (1977).
210. See Heller, supra note 1, at 522.
211. Id.
212. See supra note 209.
213. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
214.
ECMH (Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis) theory implies that trading
by those with nonpublic information-insider trading-increases the in-
formation flow to the market and thereby improves efficiency. Thus,
economic considerations do not justify restrictions on insider trading.
However, insider trading presents difficult moral questions that have been
debated widely by both legal scholars and economists.
Note, supra note 209, at 1073-74 (emphasis added).
215. See notes 182-206.
216. Id.
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On a more fundamental level, greater disapproval of abuses involv-
ing securities transactions is necessary, not only within the legal and
business communities but throughout the entire investing public.
Trading on material nonpublic information is difficult to discover. 217
Even when such cases are disclosed, however, the public reaction
often falls far short of the condemnation engendered by other forms of
illegal activity. Indeed, insider traders may be often secretly envied by
other members of the investing community, a reaction which can only
decrease faith in the integrity of the capital markets and the securities
laws. The standard of ethical behavior required must be substantially
higher than the mere morality of the marketplace.
This Note does not argue that the total elimination of unfair secur-
ities trading based upon confidential information-whether by in-
siders or outsiders-will occur in the forseeable future. Given the
potential for financial gain, such an expectation would be either too
naive or too utopian to be credible. The more realistic goal of limiting
instances of insider trading recognizes human nature and accepts the
fact that there will always be certain individuals who will violate the
securities laws by trading on inside information.2 18 By developing a
coherent body of legal doctrine to address these inevitable excesses,
the securities markets will be protected from becoming forums of
fraudulent and unfair activity.
VII. Conclusion
This Note has examined the subject of insider trading and the
development of the duty to disclose material nonpublic information.
While the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws have
traditionally been the remedy for insider trading violations, new legis-
lative approaches have been offered as alternative solutions for lower-
ing the level of insider trading activity. Because they would enhance
present sanctions, such proposals should be supported as valuable
additions to the law on insider trading.
Frank P. Luberti, Jr.
217. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. See also Noble, How the S.E.C.
Watches Stocks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1984, at D1, col. 4; Blumstein, Wall St.
Columns Get Wide Scrutiny, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1984, at D5, col. 1; Jones, Profits
for Lawyer Reported, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1984, at D5, col. 4; SEC's Inquiry Widens
As It Questions Broker, Others in Journal Case, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 6;
Jones, Journal Says a Reporter Is Under S.E.C. Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1984,
at D1, col. 1; SEC Investigates Charges of Traders Profiting on Leaks by Journal
Reporter, Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 1984, at 3, col. 2.
218. "The question is are we going to abolish human nature? I would say not
likely." Blumstein, supra note 14, at D5 (quoting James Balog, Senior Executive Vice
President, Drexel Burnham Lambert).
806 [Vol. XII
